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1. INTRODUCTION
The Dutch book argument of de Finetti (1931) is a classic coherence condition
for the existence and uniqueness of subjective probabilities. It also provides a stan-
dard justiﬁcation for a model of choice based on subjective expectations. Its appeal
and beauty rely on a concept of probability based on everyday life considerations
like betting. De Finetti (1976) presented the Dutch book argument as follows.
“...In English, a combination of bets devised in such a way that, prof-
iting by an inconsistency in the odds given by the bookmaker, someone
is certain to win whatever happens is called ‘Dutch Book’ (I don’t know
why). However, if one wants to, this term could be used to express
the condition of consistency that is the sole basis on which the whole
theory of probability rests: suﬃce it to say that it consists in allowing
no chance of a Dutch Book occurring....”
For a formalization of the meaning of Dutch book, see Wakker (1989). Accord-
ing to Kyburg and Smokler (1964, page 11): “The restriction to coherence thus
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1formulates a natural criterion of rationality in situations of uncertainty. Rational-
ity is used in a normative sense here; coherence formulates a criterion of how a
person’s degrees of belief ought to be related.” The debate on the normative aspect
of the argument is still going on.
In its original formulation, the argument is not immune to descriptive violations:
its behavioral bite has been challenged by experimental evidence (see, e.g., Ellsberg
1961 and Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Consider the following example.
Suppose Bruna decides to purchase an insurance contract for her country house,
clearly the insurance payments depend on some states of the world (for example ﬁre,
ﬂood, earthquake). Her preferences among contracts are the following: (3,3,3) <
(12,0,0), (3,3,3) < (0,12,0), and (3,3,3) < (0,0,12). The contract (12,0,0) means
12 thousands of euros if ﬁre, 0 if ﬂood, and 0 if earthquake. The other contracts are
deﬁned similarly. These preferences are behaviorally plausible: in order to obtain
a general purpose coverage, Bruna prefers to receive an equal and relatively small
reimbursement in all states of the world, than taking the risk of full reimbursement
in one state and nothing in the others. Considering all the preferences together
yields (9,9,9) < (12,12,12): a Dutch book. It looks like an undesirable result: a
set of good decisions, when taken together should still be good.
This note, while using Dutch book arguments, shows how to extend and general-
ize de Finetti’s approach in order to accommodate this kind of descriptive violations.
The way to accommodate them is a weaker concept of coherence in a nonadditive
environment. The ﬁrst step is to allow Dutch books only when the involved gam-
bles are not comonotonic (as in Bruna’s country house example), thus extending
to the inﬁnite case Theorem 6 in Diecidue and Wakker (2001) and providing a
general, Dutch book based, characterization of the most popular rank-dependent
model of Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler 1989). From an empirical point of
view rank-dependent models have received a good deal of attention (see Birnbaum
and McIntosh 1996, Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000, Gonzalez and Wu 1999, Harless
and Camerer 1994, Tversky and Fox 1995). In particular many works focus on the
evaluation of the rank-dependent probabilities (see Abdellaoui 2000, Bleichrodt,
van Rijn, and Johannesson 1999, Luce 2000, Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
On the other hand, in some situations, also the assumption of no Dutch books
when the bets are comonotonic might be “reasonably” violated. Consider the fol-
lowing example.
John needs a new bike. He has found a second hand one for 40 euros. He is
now at the horse races trying to get this amount of money. He is evaluating alter-
native monetary gambles on a three-horses race and has the following preferences:
(40,50,60) < (30,80,90) and (40,80,90) < (60,60,70). The gamble (40,50,60)
means that John will get 40 euros if the ﬁrst horse wins the race, 50 if the second
wins, and 60 if the third does. The other gambles are deﬁned similarly. The ﬁrst
preference is motivated by the need of the bike: the second gamble involves the risk
of not aﬀording it. This time, the gambles are comonotonic, but considering all the
preferences together gives (80,130,150) < (90,140,160): a Dutch book.
This calls for an additional generalization, which is the main contribution of
this note. Allowing Dutch books only when the involved gambles are not aﬃnely
related, we provide a Dutch-book-based characterization of invariant biseparable
preferences (see Ghirardato and Marinacci 2001, and Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and
Marinacci 2001). Moreover, with a further uncertainty aversion assumption, we get
Min expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989) the generalized expected utility
model most successful for ﬁnance applications (see Epstein and Wang 1994 and
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Finally, considering the minimal requirement of no Dutch books existing when
the involved gambles are sure prospects, we obtain a very general, still appealing,
concept of prevision.
To sum up. De Finetti, via the Dutch book argument, justiﬁed a model of choice
based on expectations. We extend his approach in such a manner that the gener-
alized argument can provide a new foundation for some very general nonexpected
utility models of choice. These models are more and more popular and success-
ful in economics and psychology, see for example Camerer (1999) and Starmer
(2000). From an applied point of view, QALY evaluations of health policies in a
rank-dependent spirit have received increasing attention (Bleichrodt, van Rijn, and
Johannesson 1999, Miyamoto 1988, 1999).
In the next section we present the result, then conclusions follow.
2. GENERALIZED DUTCH BOOKS AND COHERENCE
2.1. The set-up
We consider a standard subjective setting; bets are simply “...wagers on any
facts and for any amount...” (de Finetti 1976). Formally, let S be the set of
states of the world and Σ be the events algebra. A bet is represented by a simple
measurable function f =
PN
i=1 αi1Ai (the bettor wins αi euros if event Ai obtains),
or, in general, by a bounded measurable function f (the bettor wins f (s) euros if
state s obtains). The set of all simple bets is B0 = B0 (S,Σ), while the set of all
bets is B = B (S,Σ): the supnorm closure of B0. As usual we identify the real
number α with the constant bet α1S.
Two bets f and g are comonotonic if [f (s) − f (s0)][g (s) − g (s0)] ≥ 0 for all
s,s0 ∈ S (see Schmeidler 1986 and 1989); while they are aﬃnely related if there
exists α ≥ 0 and β ∈ R such that f = αg + β or g = αf + β (see Gilboa and
Schmeidler 1989 and Ghirardato, Klibanoﬀ, and Marinacci 1998). These concepts
are now commonly used and their meanings well discussed in the literature, so we
will not indulge on them here.
Let < be a binary relation on B representing the preferences of a decision maker
among the bets; as usual,  denotes the asymmetric part of <, and ∼ denotes the
symmetric one. The crucial notion is the following.
Definition 1. A Dutch book consists of two arrays of simple bets f1,...,fM,







all states s ∈ S.
This notion represents something undesirable, therefore coherence requires that
no Dutch book is allowed. Whenever all the involved bets are pairwise comonotonic
we call the book a comonotonic Dutch book, while if they are aﬃnely related we call
it aﬃne Dutch book, ﬁnally when they are constant we call it trivial Dutch book.
In the sequel we make use of the following properties of <.
• Weak Order: For all f and g in B: f < g or g < f. For all f,g, and h in
B: if f < g and g < h, then f < h.
• Monotonicity: For all f and g in B: if f (s) ≥ g (s) for all s ∈ S, then
f < g.
3• Fair Price: For each f in B, there exists ξ = ξ (f) ∈ R such that f ∼ ξ.3
• Uncertainty Aversion: For all f and g in B and all α in (0,1): f ∼ g
implies αf + (1 − α)g < f.
Before stating the result a few more ingredients are needed. A functional V :
B → R is monotonic if V (f) ≥ V (g) whenever f ≥ g, it is a prevision if it is
monotonic and V (β) = β for all β ∈ R, ﬁnally it is constant-linear if V (αf + β) =
αV (f) + β for all f ∈ B, α ≥ 0 and β ∈ R.
2.2. The result
We can now state the anticipated representation result.
Theorem 1. A binary relation < on B is a monotonic weak order that satisﬁes
the fair price property and allows no trivial Dutch books iﬀ there exists a prevision
V : B → R representing <. Moreover:
(i) the relation < allows no aﬃne Dutch books iﬀ the prevision V is constant-
linear;
(ii) the relation < allows no comonotonic Dutch books iﬀ there exists a capacity
C such that V (f) =
R
S fdC;




The prevision V is unique.
As anticipated in the Introduction, (i) characterizes invariant biseparable pref-
erences, (ii) - extending to the inﬁnite case Diecidue and Wakker (2001) - yields
Choquet expectations, while (iii) is the famous de Finetti Dutch book Theorem.
Among the many works referring to point three we mention: Berti, Regazzini, and
Rigo (2002), Berti and Rigo (2000), Blackwell and Girshick (1954), Cifarelli and
Regazzini (1996), Coletti (1990), Crisma, Gigante, and Millossovich (1997), Holzer
(1985), Regazzini (1985), and Wakker (1989).
Proof. If f ∼ ξ, set V (f) = ξ. V is well deﬁned, in fact the fair price is unique.
Assume the contrary: there exist f ∈ B and ξ > γ ∈ R such that f ∼ ξ and f ∼ γ,
hence γ < ξ, but γ < ξ: a trivial Dutch book. It is easy to verify that V represents
<, in particular V is monotonic.
Assume < allows no aﬃne Dutch books. Next we show that V (f + β) = V (f)+
β for all f ∈ B0 and all β ∈ R. Let V (f + β) = γ, V (f) = ξ and, by contradiction
γ > ξ + β. The bets f + β,ξ,f, and γ are aﬃnely related,4 and f + β < γ, ξ < f,
but f + ξ + β < γ + f: an aﬃne Dutch book.
In the same manner: V (nf) = nV (f) for all f ∈ B0 and all n ∈ N. Assume
V (nf) = γ, V (f) = ξ and γ > nξ. The bets nf,ξ,f, and γ are aﬃnely related, and
nf < γ, ξ < f, but nf+nξ < nf+γ: an aﬃne Dutch book. Hence, V (qf) = qV (f)
for all f ∈ B0 and all q ∈ Q+.
3ξ (f) is also called certainty equivalent of f.
4Notice that for all f ∈ B and all ξ ∈ R, ξ = 0f + ξ implies that f and ξ are aﬃnely related.
4Let fn ∈ B0, and assume fn → f ∈ B uniformly. There exists {γn} ⊆ R+ such
that γn → 0 and fn − γn ≤ f ≤ fn + γn, hence
V (fn) − γn = V (fn − γn) ≤ V (f) ≤ V (fn + γn) = V (fn) + γn,
therefore V (fn) → V (f). In particular, V is supnorm continuous in B0.
Let α > 0, f ∈ B0 and {qn} ⊆ Q+ such that qn → α. Hence qnf → αf
uniformly, so V (αf) = limn V (qnf) = limn qnV (f) = αV (f). In sum, V is
constant-linear and supnorm continuous on B0. By uniform approximation with
simple measurable functions, it is easy to show that V is constant-linear and con-
tinuous on the whole B.
Next we show that a preference represented by a constant linear prevision allows
no aﬃne Dutch books. By contradiction, let f1 < g1,...,fM < gM in B0 be






































gj (s), for all states s, and V , being monotonic and constant













absurd. This concludes the proof of (i).
Assume < allows no comonotonic Dutch books. Next we show that V (f + g) =
V (f) + V (g) for all comonotonic f,g ∈ B0. Let V (f + g) = γ, V (f) = ξ and
V (g) = θ and γ > ξ+θ. Then f +g,ξ,θ,γ,f,g are comonotonic,5 f +g < γ, ξ < f,
θ < g, but f + g + ξ + θ < γ + f + g: a Comonotonic Dutch book. By Schmeidler
(1986) there exists a capacity C such that V|B0(f) =
R
fdC for all f ∈ B0. V and R
·dC are both monotonic and constant linear, hence continuous in B, and they
coincide on B0 which is dense in B, then V =
R
·dC. Which proves (ii), since the
same argument we used to exclude aﬃne Dutch books for preferences represented
by a constant linear prevision now permits to exclude comonotonic Dutch books
for preferences represented by a Choquet integral. Clearly, the well known (iii) can
be obtained in a similar way.
Next we consider the consequences of uncertainty aversion on constant-linear
previsions.
Corollary 1. Let < be a relation on B represented by a constant linear pre-
vision V : B → R. The relation < is uncertainty averse iﬀ there exists a (unique)




Notice that, in the special case in which V (f) =
R
fdC this simply means
that < is uncertainty averse iﬀ C is a convex capacity. While the case in which
V (f) =
R
fdP is characterized by uncertainty neutrality.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 3.3 in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
5Just remember f and g are comonotonic, and apply the deﬁnition of comonotonicity.
53. CONCLUSIONS
The Dutch book argument is a now classical coherence condition for the exis-
tence of subjective probabilities. In this note we have investigated the possibility
of using this type of argument to shed more light on some successful nonexpected
utility models. The result is formally unifying and is still suggestive, even if it
may lack some normative contents (which, however face some criticism also in the
original formulation, see e.g. Schick 1986). On the other hand, it is consistent with
a descriptive approach. As a matter of fact, it is possible to construct examples
showing that Dutch books can pop up in real life situations.
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